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THE PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECT OF ANARCHISM 
IN ROBERT PAUL WOLFF’S THOUGHT
In order to better understand the subjects under consideration here, it is worth be-
ginning with a brief overview of the various forms of anarchism, in conjunction 
with the essential characteristics of those which are deemed as most relevant to 
the issues at hand. It is necessary to locate the so-called philosophical anarchism 
mainstream in a broader framework, to show its sources and to select the funda-
mental differences that exist between this approach and other forms of anarchism. 
Already, at the outset, some divisions are visible which will help to define a kind of 
framework for future analysis.
Based on various studies, sources, and the definitions given by different en-
cyclopedias, some contractual lines of the primary classifications can be marked. 
According to these, the first dividing line runs between political and philosophical 
anarchism, and the second will be marked out between individualist, collectivist 
(communal, or sometimes even known as communist anarchism1), and anarcho-
syndicalism. The third dividing line will be recognized as the distinction between 
a priori and a posteriori philosophical anarchism2. At the outset we should also note 
that Robert Paul Wolff’s approach will be taken into special consideration in this 
paper. This American philosopher of law and politics is today regarded (particularly 
in the United States, but also in other English-speaking countries), as an authority in 
these areas. Therefore, as a main aim of this paper we should consider (in addition 
to the separation of philosophical anarchism from other current anarchist appro-
1 We may encounter various classifications of political anarchism. Sometimes the communal anarchism of 
Bakunin is classified as anarcho-communism. See: D. Miller, Anarchism, London 1984, p. 45.
2 It is supposed that this classification was first presented by A. J. Simmons.
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aches mentioned previously) an attempt to reconstruct the idea of philosophical 
anarchism and a critical overview of its basic assumptions.
It will probably come as no revelation if we draw the conclusion that poli-
tical anarchism considers as its main premise the overthrow of the state. Equally 
obvious is the lack of acceptance and final rejection of any political government. 
The state itself is seen as an extremely inappropriate, even sometimes evil form of 
social organization. This also leads to the statement that the existence of the state 
and, moreover, of any power within it, will never remain legitimized. Certainly, 
looking at these clearly outlined features, the vision of social life is not based on 
well-known political institutions, but on completely different alternatives.
The individualistic version of anarchism was developed mainly in the Uni-
ted States of America, and this fact is hardly surprising, especially given the well-
known tradition of the region and certain, also very specific, economic determi-
nants. It is worth mentioning, though, that the most individualistic approach ever 
was presented by Max Stirner, a philosopher born in Bavaria. He believed that 
beyond individuals there is no reality. His main goal was to free the individual from 
what he always called tyranny. This tyranny could have a variety of sources, e.g. 
religious, philosophical or political3.
In general, belief in the sovereignty of the human being was taken from 
liberal ideas. It was then easily extended to political issues, and in the end it was 
concluded that it is impossible to merge the sovereignty of the individual conce-
ived in this way and existence of the state. The most important thing is to prevent 
a situation in which the sphere of the individual’s activities (which are the supreme 
values) would have been disrupted, in particular, bodily integrity, and lawful acqu-
ired property4. In principle, the individual could do what he or she wanted, with 
sovereign status within his or her territory. Any incursion of the individual into the 
private sphere of another was not allowed, unless the individual acquiesced to this, 
or such a situation was caused by an exchange, contract, or a free gift.
However, if the interference was of a different nature than the options men-
tioned above, then this action was considered as a kind of invasion. Consequently, 
this invasion could be legitimately resisted by force, if the situation so required. The 
damages and injury caused (any harm treated as a result of the invasion) needed to 
be compensated. Thus, the limit of discriminating power used by the aggressor and 
that which was used for defense was laid out quite clearly.
Significant weight was also attached to acts of charity, which were consi-
dered extremely valuable. However, such acts had some limitations which had to 
meet certain conditions, for example they had to be made voluntarily, so they were 
not mandatory, and could thus in no way be forced on anyone.5
3 S. Shatz, The Essential Works of Anarchism, New York 1972, p. 42.
4 D. Miller, Anarchism, London 1984, p. 30.
5 Ibidem.
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Sometimes it is emphasized that while 19th-century individualist anarchism 
is embedded in the socialist movement, its followers, from the early 20th centu-
ry, who called themselves anarcho-capitalists, preferred an emphasis on the free, 
unrestricted market, with all kinds of goods, so the state as institution ceases to be 
necessary. Benjamin Tucker speaks similarly, commenting on the assumptions of, 
inter alia, Proudhon and Warren, also considered to be representatives of the main-
stream of individualist mechanism.
Even the simple police function of protecting person and property they deny to govern-
ments supported by compulsory taxation. Protection they look upon as a thing to be secured, as long 
as it is necessary, by voluntary association and cooperation for self-defense, or as a commodity to 
be purchased, like any other commodity, of those who offer the best article at the lowest price. In 
their view it is in itself an invasion of the individual to compel him to pay for or suffer a protection 
against invasion that he has not asked for and does not desire. And they further claim that protection 
will become a drug in the market, after poverty and consequently crime have disappeared through 
the realization of their economic program. Compulsory taxation is to them the life-principle of all 
the monopolies, and passive, but organized, resistance to the tax-collector they contemplate, when 
the proper time comes, as one of the most effective methods of accomplishing their purposes6.
It is quite clearly evident that the so-called early individualists, to whom 
Tucker undoubtedly belongs, see the benefits reaped by the capitalist class as 
a result of the monopolistic practices created based on the extension of the state’s 
competences. Therefore they turned towards the working classes, in particular 
towards individuals running small businesses. They stressed the importance of 
self-employed entities, operating in the market as a single enterprise.
Nor does the Anarchistic scheme furnish any code of morals to be imposed upon the in-
dividual. “Mind your own business” is its only moral law. Interference with another’s business is 
a crime and the only crime, and as such may properly be resisted. In accordance with this view the 
Anarchists look upon attempts to arbitrarily suppress vice as in themselves crimes. They believe 
liberty and the resultant social well-being to be a sure cure for all the vices7.
In turn, Rothbard saw the opportunity to build a broad coalition of co-wor-
kers, business representatives, students, and even national minorities, opposing the 
ideas of the revolutionary movements, both collectivist and anarcho-communist. 
He also denied the social democratic approach, maintaining that “libertarianism – 
a private-ownership anarchism – is morally empowered and competent, and all [...] 
the socialists are in manifest error.”8
The remarks cited above allow us to highlight some major characteristics 
which can be distinguished in this branch of anarchism. In the first instance let us 
recall the principle of sovereignty of the individual, which can also be linked with 
6 B. R. Tucker, Instead of a Book, by A Man Too Busy to Write One; A Fragmentary Exposition of Philo-
sophical Anarchism Culled from the Writings of Benj. R. Tucker, New York 1969, p. 14.
7 Ibidem, p. 16.
8 M. N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto, London 1978, p. 309–312.
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the statement that it is better not to deliver public goods than to require that, in order 
to generate them, individuals must bear certain financial outlays. Secondly, when 
the state is entrusted with the task, which is collection of funds from individuals in 
the form of compulsory taxation, individuals who are in power do not have any in-
centive to ensure whether the goods are actually favorable at the moment. Perhaps 
these goods are “false”, totally unnecessary goods, and their distribution causes 
only growth of the bureaucratic apparatus. And thirdly, we can find the opinion, 
shared by most anarchists, that the mere establishment of the state may raise the 
risk that the benefits provided are not commensurate with the potential effects of 
state interference on individual liberty.
Political, individualistic anarchism obviously particularly emphasizes indi-
vidual autonomy and freedom as a basic priority. As pointed out by Wolff, “the 
autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous, is not subject to the will of another. 
He may do what another tells him, but not because he has been told to do it. He 
is therefore, in the political sense of the word, free....”9 This type of approach pro-
motes the idea of the undisturbed sphere of the individual, in conjunction with its 
absolute sovereignty. What’s more, in this context, social relationships are seen in 
the category of contractual interactions that occur between independent parties, 
with the ability to lead a life beyond the social environment and its influences10. 
This statement seems to be far from the truth, becoming the grounds for criticism. 
Leaving aside the elements of criticism mentioned above, let us just note that it is 
very difficult to imagine the possibility of man able to live outside the network of 
social relations, institutions and practices. Institutions and practices undoubtedly 
have a significant role in shaping individuals, and therefore cannot be regarded as 
external to the self-reliant person11.
Two of the issues raised so far seem to be extremely important for the subject 
at hand. The first should be considered as relating to public goods, in particular 
criticism of the state’s role in its delivery. This stands, as we can see, in particular 
opposition to the assumptions of fair play theory, and is especially at odds with the 
position presented by another American philosopher, George Klosko12. 
However, the second of these issues applies to the idea of voluntariness and 
its perception by anarchists. 
On the other hand, emphasis is placed with equal power on the thesis that 
no state institution is proactive, and therefore is not based on voluntary agreement. 
9 R. P. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, New York 1970, p. 14.
10 J. Horton, Political Obligation, London 1992, p. 117.
11 As a side note, due to the problems that had arisen around this approach, in the 20th century a need to 
modify it appeared, and the concept of anarcho-capitalism (or market anarchism) was born on the basis of this 
approach. Narveson stresses that if anarchism is possible at all, it must be in its market version, where production 
is controlled by individuals or groups acting unconstrained and distribution of goods is based solely on voluntary 
exchange. J. Narveson, The Anarchist’s Case, [in:] For and Against the State, ed. J. T. Sanders, J. Narveson, Lan-
ham 1996, p. 197.
12 See: G. Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation, “Ethics” 1987, Vol. 97, No. 2; 
G. Klosko, Multiple Principles of Political Obligation, “Political Theory” 2004, Vol. 32, No. 6.
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The state, on the contrary, is seen as a creature using coercion, being exploitative of 
individuals and fundamentally wrong.
Having outlined the basic elements that can be described as characteristic of 
individualist anarchism, it remains to discuss in just a few sentences what is called 
collectivist anarchism. It should be stressed that this characteristic will not bring 
any specific distinction or nuance. The only task is to approximate the fundamental 
determinants of the concept as a whole. Current collectivist anarchism, primarily, 
is clearly associated with the classical representatives of this direction, mainly with 
Bakunin, Proudhon, and also Kropotkin13. Indeed, it is hard not to agree with the 
assumption that this direction of anarchism has much in common with the socia-
list tradition. However, on the other hand, we cannot expect that no differences 
between the two may be observed. On the contrary, a number of elements make 
collectivist anarchism (in many ways) quite different from ideas classified as so-
cialist. This distinction is particularly evident in the focus of the latter, centralized 
forms of organization and state control14 – even if they are not treated in terms of 
the ultimate goal, but at least as a means to build an ideal society. Collectivistic 
anarchists, in spite of their socialist tendencies, have been treated by socialists as 
utopians, and this was one of the main reasons for the rejection of the anarchistic, 
collectivistic vision by socialists. Socialists have argued that such ideas are impos-
sible to initiate15.
As can be seen from the very beginning, these two ideas – collectivist and 
individualist anarchism – came about from quite different foundations, which do 
not share a similar relation to the issue of coercion. Each time, all kinds of anarchist 
manifestations are condemned, and in addition the main objective of the collecti-
vist approach is a desire to settle social organization on the principle of free com-
munity. Therefore, one can notice a greater tendency among collectivists to share 
the thesis on the cooperative concept of human nature. People naturally combine to 
form a group whose main task is to coordinate economic activities and to provide 
mutual assistance by all the members of the community16.
[…] the idea of mutualité, which was to be one of the twin pillars of Proudhon’s anarchism; 
he conceived the plan of a great mutual aid association among all the workers that would save them 
from the perils of those economic crises during which they were normally forced to sell their labor 
at starvation prices. The other Proudhonian pillar, federalism, was the subject of much discussion 
and even experiment during the Revolution.17
13 More can be found in: P. McLaughlin’s, Mikhail Bakunin: The Philosophical Basis of His Theory of 
Anarchism, New York 2002.
14 Joll draws attention to the fact that there was a clear gap growing between these two ideologies in these 
years, observed particularly in France. However, the separation started much earlier – in 1870. See J. Joll, The 
Anarchists, London 1964, chapter IV.
15 Idem, The Second International 1889–1914, p. 56–62.
16 J. P. Clark, What Is Anarchism?, [in:] Anarchism, ed. J. R. Pennock, J. W. Chapman, New York 1978, p. 22.
17 G. Woodcock, Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements, Cleveland 1962, p. 52.
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It can be concluded that in this perspective, people are not perceived in terms 
of holders of certain natural rights, as was previously discussed with representatives 
of individualist anarchism, but altogether they are considered as, on the one hand, 
independent and, on the other, related in their network of interactions between each 
other. Equally important and distinctive in addition is the strong withdrawal from 
cherishing  of private property to the degree it was done by the individualists. The 
same applies to the formation of the human individual within the community. For 
communal anarchists such a process is one of the most important sources of sta-
bility that can be determined within a social group. The members of society share 
a common practice, often based on cooperation, established voluntarily, and rela-
tionships in such large groups are usually perceived as harmonious. This does not 
mean the absence of differences, or exclude the existence of conflicts and misun-
derstandings. According to the statement above, by removing a state considered in 
this case as a principal oppressive element, it will be possible to expose and make 
better use of the natural human tendency to build cooperative and voluntary struc-
tures. At the same time such a structure would be composed of free individuals, 
with a regard to achieving greater prosperity18.
Undoubtedly, collectivistic anarchists were aware of the possible distur-
bance of social order, due to spreading of various forms of behavior commonly 
regarded as anti-social. They believed, however, that the solution to these problems 
is possible through the power of universal education, current habits and new, com-
pletely voluntary communities. It is worth mentioning the important meaning of 
habits, especially in conjunction with legislation. Besides understanding the clear 
distinction between law and custom19, we can identify a desire for searching for 
new possibilities, finding new ways to organize society. Kropotkin pointed out that 
humanity is looking for new solutions, and even now finding them. He gives the ex-
amples of international railway lines and international mail as institutions operating 
on the principle of voluntary and multilateral arrangements that can successfully 
replace state law20.
The positive law established by state institutions is sometimes seen as, on 
the one hand, arbitrary, and on the other hand as a tool of coercion, usually imposed 
by the will of the minority. The only thing that can be accepted is the existence of 
certain social forms of obligations arising from the vision of a cooperative and 
blossoming society, existing without state power. Secondly we can claim that the 
social existence of individuals and groups can successfully operate without any 
element of coercion.
The collectivist varieties of anarchism and its representatives, in particular, 
focus on highlighting unique and irreplaceable values. Mainly we can find em-
18 W. M. Phillips, Nightmares of Anarchy: Language and Cultural Change, 1870–1914, Lewisburg 
2003, p. 50.
19 J. Horton, Political…, p. 121.
20 P. Kropotkin, Zdobycie chleba, Kraków–Warszawa 1925, p. 29.
127THE PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECT OF ANARCHISM...
phasis on the importance of reciprocity as well as free and limitless cooperation. 
Proponents of this trend imagine that the existence of a society organized in the 
form of free initiatives is possible. Such a society affecting every aspect of social 
life (education, economics, culture) and realization of such a vision could be forced 
by the rejection of all sorts of systems, accompanied by an unshakable, optimistic 
belief in the positive qualities of human nature21.
With a solid foundation in the forms and general characteristics of the main 
anarchist tendencies, it is possible to attempt to present and analyze the philosophi-
cal anarchist approach. A broad spectrum of the different forms of anarchism could 
still be successfully analyzed; the characteristics outlined above cannot in this re-
spect be considered as complete. This does not provide sufficient comments on 
many varieties of anarchism, such as the political one, and especially on those 
generally known by the term “collectivist anarchism”. All varieties, without any 
exception, focused on one common element – negation of the state and other insti-
tutions, considered as compulsory. “Of course anarchists do not deny that states are 
thought to possess legitimate authority by many of their subjects; that is a fact about 
the world which nobody in their senses would try to conceal. The anarchist view is 
simply that the belief is false, that no state has the right which it claims which its 
subjects generally concede. It is an argument about principles, not about facts”22. 
Something that is also relevant to philosophical anarchism is undermining the es-
sence of political power as such. This type of lack of acceptance, or even denial 
of political power is a guiding feature of philosophical anarchism, but at the same 
time it is not considered to be a distinctive one because its presence is visible in 
the whole of anarchist thought. For a clearer separation of philosophical anarchism 
from other anarchist forms, it would be necessary to provide a more detailed analy-
sis which can reveal a number of issues that would more precisely characterize this 
particular idea.
We shall begin this discussion with a statement by David Miller, who notes 
that “philosophical anarchism, it should be stressed, is not a variety of anarchism 
in the sense in which individualist and communist anarchism are varieties: it does 
not encapsulate any model of anarchist society, nor any recipe for destroying the 
state and other coercive institutions. It is rather a philosophical attitude, a way of 
responding to authority. It can contribute to an anarchist outlook only when com-
bined with a substantive ideology.”23
Important, from this point of view, can be anarchists’ attitude to power. We 
should draw attention to the distinction between authority and power: namely, in 
the moment of a dangerous situation, more adequate will be the recognition of 
strength, not the power (authority). Anarchists are obviously aware of the state 
21 P. Marshall, Human Nature and Anarchism, [in:] For Anarchism: History, Theory, and Practice, ed. 
D. Goodway, London–New York 1989, p. 127–149.
22 D. Miller, Anarchism…, p. 15.
23 Ibidem, p. 16.
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power, and pay attention to the potential mechanisms used to enforce obedience 
to its dictates. However, acceptance of such a relationship should not be mistaken 
with acceptance of the authority.
The question raised by Miller, which concerns distinguishing acceptance of 
the authority from the state’s strength, corresponds with a statement often invoked 
as the typical assumption of philosophical anarchism. Namely the question here is 
about the lack of legitimacy of the state’s power. The main thesis of philosophical 
anarchists is close to the statement that all states are currently illegitimate. Support 
for this view arises from many sources, in other words, we can distinguish vari-
ous substrates. The first of these sources can be considered to be a strong belief in 
the subject of individual autonomy, which constituted the core of the individual-
ist position briefly characterized above. The idea of free choice, coupled with the 
state, understood as an involuntary institution, causes the existence of a conflict 
between authority and autonomy24. In addition, one should mention the problem 
of social values, especially their failure (e.g. increasingly deepening lack of soli-
darity between people), leading to alienation or even social atrophy, which affects 
individuals and maintains divisions between existing groups. Another source may 
also be the ideal of equality, especially equal rights and equal opportunities, which 
in currently existing systems is difficult, if not impossible to accomplish25. We may 
assume that the sources mentioned above are sometimes identified as a comprehen-
sive foundation for contemporary criticism of philosophical anarchism.
Lack of legitimacy is the most notable, essential element in the philosophical 
anarchist position, which expressly provides a separation of this stream from the 
other types of anarchism. It is worth stressing that philosophical anarchists do not 
treat the lack of legitimacy of the state in terms of a moral order to eliminate the 
state. This can be viewed as a quite unusual feature, but the expected lack of legiti-
macy is treated more in terms of the basis for the removal of any moral foundation 
supporting the conviction of the need for obedience. In this case the obedience is 
understood as conforming with the standards created by the state, or as support and 
cooperation with its institutions26. Adoption of such a position does not mean lack 
of differentiation within this approach. As already mentioned, philosophical anar-
chism is not uniform; we can easily indicate some significant differences, which 
will be presented briefly with special emphasis on the ideas of Robert Paul Wolff.
On the basis of philosophical anarchism the leading representatives of this 
idea can be distinguished, as well as a series of its interpretations and classifica-
tions. Sometimes it is suggested that the whole of modern philosophical anarchism 
consists of three main approaches: namely, the first represented by William God-
24 R. P. Wolff, In Defense…, p. 12–19.
25 See: K. Nielsen, State Authority and Legitimacy, [in:] On Political Obligation, ed. P. Harris, Lon-
don–New York 1990.
26 A. J. Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations, Cambridge 2001, p. 102.
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win, centered around the principle of utility27, the second, highly individualistic and 
self-oriented, personified by Max Stirner28 (briefly discussed earlier), and the third, 
the most modern, and still being developed by Wolff. Analysis of these historical 
assumptions would go far beyond the scope of this article, and we therefore focus 
on the characterization of Wolff’s contemporary approach. 
The principle of own, independent judgment is undoubtedly one of the cen-
tral points of philosophical anarchism, and now Wolff is considered as the main fol-
lower of this approach29. In particular, he draws attention to the issue of individuals’ 
moral autonomy and responsibility for their actions.
Since man’s responsibility for his actions is a consequence of his capacity for choice, he 
cannot give it up or put it aside. He can refuse to acknowledge it, however, either deliberately or 
by simply failing to recognize his moral condition. All men refuse to take responsibility for their 
actions at some time or other during their lives, and some men so consistently shirk their duty that 
they present more the appearance of overgrown children than of adults. Inasmuch as moral auto-
nomy is simply the condition of taking full responsibility for one’s actions, it follows that men can 
forfeit their autonomy at will. That is to say, a man can decide to obey the commands of another 
without making any attempt to determine for himself whether what is commanded is good or wise30. 
A further important point is the impossibility of giving up on one’s indepen-
dence31, which will be discussed later. The possibility of making free judgments, 
however, is not only relevant to Godwin or Wolff; it is treated as a priority by most 
authors who consider themselves to be Kantians. This conviction is accompanied 
by the philosophers associated with the empirical tradition, as well as other theori-
sts, not necessarily viewed as philosophers32. This does not mean, however, that 
Wolff fully adopted Kant’s assumptions without making any modifications. The 
important thing is that he began to see the autonomy of the human being in terms 
of a specific moral duty or a rudimental, human obligation. On the other hand, 
from Kant’s standpoint, autonomy is necessary, but more as a hypothesis, which 
helps to explain the possible existence of universal moral concepts we use. “Robert 
27 T. Honderich, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford 1995, p. 321.
28 Ibidem, p. 852.
29 Wolff is generally recognized as the most important representative of philosophical anarchism; there 
are, nonetheless, those who question this opinion, e.g. H. Frankfurt. In his article he analyzes thoroughly the as-
sumptions of Wolff and eventually comes to the conclusion that Wolff, when talking about unanimous democratic 
consent for the necessary arbitration in solving economic conflicts (R. P. Wolff, In Defense…, p. 24–25), assumes 
that individuals give their consent to follow a certain decision-making procedure, which means that those making 
a decision according to this procedure have the right to expect that the procedure will be complied with, which 
subsequently entails an obligation on behalf of those who gave their consent. H. G. Frankfurt, The Anarchism of 
Robert Paul Wolff, “Political Theory” 1973, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 413–414. It seems, however, more justified to treat 
this issue as a fragmentary lack of cohesion in Wolff’s concept rather than deny unequivocally that his theory is 
anarchistic in character.
30 R. P. Wolff, In Defense…, p. 15.
31 Ibidem, p. 12–14, 71–72.
32 G. Wall, Philosophical Anarchism Revisited, [in:] Anarchism, ed. J. R. Pennock, J. W. Chapman, New 
York 1978, p. 274.
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Paul Wolff’s treatment of autonomy as the ‘Kantian’ primary obligation of man has 
the following consequences: it leads to treating ‘autonomy’ as a substantive duty, 
contrary both to Kant and good sense; this error leads to neglect of Kant’s notion 
that the primary substantive moral duty of men is to treat other men as end-in-
themselves whose dignity ought to be respected.”33
The crucial point for the analytical proposals of Wolff’s philosophical anar-
chism seems to be set by the fundamental problem, namely the question of how the 
moral autonomy which the individual has may interact with the legitimized state 
power. In the first instance it finds, therefore, that a major determinant of the state is 
its power. State power is achieved by, on the one hand, the right to issue orders, and 
on the other, the principle of correlation, the right to expect obedience to the dicta-
tes. This point shows a commitment to comply with the orders of power expected 
from those to whom the authority is exercised. However, the question is how such 
an obligation corresponds with moral autonomy of individuals, especially when 
we consider that the primary duty of every human being is to have autonomy? 
“It would seem, then, that there can be no resolution of the conflict between the 
autonomy of the individual and the putative authority of the state. Insofar as a man 
fulfills his obligation to make himself the author of his decisions, he will resist the 
state’s claim to have authority over him. That is to say, he will deny that he has 
a duty to obey the laws of the state simply because they are the laws. In that sense, 
it would seem that anarchism is the only political doctrine consistent with the virtue 
of autonomy”34. Elsewhere, Wolff also clarifies how independence of the individual 
should be understood. 
[…] moral autonomy is a combination of freedom and responsibility; it is a submission to 
laws which one has made for oneself. The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous, is not 
subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but not because he has been told 
to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense of the word, free.35
Therefore, it can be noted that Wolff highlights two basic issues. At the fore-
front is the categorical rejection of the possibility of reconciling individual moral 
autonomy and political power, sometimes reinforced with logical counter-argument 
(which appears when we try to combine moral autonomy and political power). 
Wolff’s arguments constructed in this way have been widely criticized, and the re-
marks in this point will be further considered. The second of the important emerg-
ing issues is the emphasis which falls on the legitimacy understood in a de iure 
sense. It requires a brief consideration by the fact that the issue is not only discussed 
by Wolff, but is also the crucial point of the whole of philosophical anarchism.
As mentioned previously, the philosophical notion of anarchism stresses the 
fact that the existence of a legally valid authority run by a government (state) or 
33 P. Riley, On the “Kantian” Foundations of Robert Paul Wolff’s Anarchism, [in:] Anarchism…, p. 296.
34 R. P. Wolff, In Defense…, p. 18–19.
35 Ibidem, p. 14.
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executed on its behalf is impossible. The point which is stressed here does not 
concern de facto authority (control), but legitimized de jure authority. It seems 
crucial for philosophical anarchists to make this distinction for the overall sense of 
their argumentation. Therefore, it is essential to differentiate between the situation 
where the subjects of the authority in a given state believe that it is legitimate, and 
the situation where its legitimacy is factual. De jure and de facto state authorities 
are thus different from each other in one point: namely, in the first case the belief 
that the authority is legitimate is true while in the latter the authority cannot be 
considered legally valid or it is not known whether it is legally valid36. This distinc-
tion is also pointed out by Joseph Raz on the occasion of considering the definition 
of authority. He claims that there is a popular theory treating authority as capacity 
to exercise a certain type of actions and identifying de facto authority with power 
over people. Legitimate (de jure) authority may then be defined as justified efficient 
authority. It is sometimes defined as efficient authority accepted by its subjects, or 
as authority based on their consent. However, if it is to matter, then this will only be 
by showing to what degree the authority is justified37. Clearly, the above reasoning 
is slightly different from the previous type because it refers to efficacy while avoid-
ing the notion of belief. Efficient authority means factual power over people, not 
a belief concerning this power. If perceived in this way, efficient (de facto) au-
thority in the domain of political authority is indispensable from de jure authority 
(which, for example, is essential in order to distinguish legitimate and illegitimate 
use of power)38.
Let us now leave these definitional disputes, which might go considerably 
beyond the subject in hand, and return to the issue mentioned beforehand, namely, 
the problematic relation between authority and autonomy. Knowing Wolff’s theses 
on this subject, let us try to undermine them. The starting point would be consider-
ing the question of why the preservation of moral autonomy of an individual should 
have a prevailing status of duty. Wolff’s only explanation is that one cannot deny 
that “the primary obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled”39. He also 
adds elsewhere that moral conditions require from us to acknowledge our responsi-
bility and to achieve autonomy wherever and whenever it is possible40. 
However, according to Horton, moral autonomy is for the majority of us 
merely a positive ideal. It is just one of the elements of a good life, not its sole com-
ponent, and only sometimes its dominant element. Autonomy has its own position 
among other moral ideals, which relate to other individuals and determine rules of 
behavior in particular contexts. Although autonomy of an individual may at times 
be in conflict with such virtues as not harming others or supporting the ones we 
36 R. Martin, Anarchism and Scepticism, [in:] Anarchism…, p. 120–121.
37 J. Raz, Autorytet prawa, Warszawa 2000, p. 9.
38 Ibidem, p. 10–11.
39 R. P. Wolff, In Defense…, p. 18.
40 Ibidem, p. 17.
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care about, one should not assume that autonomy will always prevail over those 
virtues41.
Wolff’s claim about the superiority of individual autonomy seems signifi-
cantly impaired. His thesis that authority and autonomy are logically contradictory 
and that there is no link between the two can also be undermined. In this case, 
the issue of authorization (examined earlier when discussing contractual theories) 
should be taken into account. Does this kind of action also violate someone’s au-
tonomy? It seems rather doubtful. Not surprisingly, Wolff (and Godwin) denies the 
possibility of satisfactorily securing the authority with any sort of agreement. But 
the argument that authority and autonomy are logically contradictory is also im-
paired. Moreover, it appears unfounded to claim that the moral power of individual 
autonomy is supreme. This ideal is impossible to achieve for one reason – the ex-
istence of political authority. Further reasoning would be that acknowledging the 
supreme value of autonomy does not completely refute the possibility of coexis-
tence of autonomy and political power – because they are not necessarily logically 
contradictory.
However, Wolff’s concept presented above did not remain solitary – it 
promptly found its followers. One of the viewpoints worth mentioning, based 
largely on Wolff’s idea, but modifying it slightly, is that of Chaim Gans, Wolff’s 
commentator and follower. He indicates that the entire trend of philosophical anar-
chism focuses on denying that an obligation to obey the law of a given state actu-
ally exists. It can be seen from the very beginning that this definition is only partial 
and insufficient. According to Gans’s classification, there are two fundamental dis-
tinctive types. The first is entirely based on Wolff’s argumentation, i.e., the asser-
tion that authority and individual autonomy are incompatible. On the basis of this 
statement Gans concludes that moral obligation to obey the law contains the need 
to eschew individual moral autonomy – although it has been excluded due to being 
contradictory42. Complying with this reasoning, Gans states that this form of philo-
sophical anarchism should be called autonomy-based anarchism. The other type is 
hit by criticism, which does spare any approach trying to explain the existence of 
political obligation . According to Gans, the denial that an obligation to obey laws 
exists is based on rejection of its grounds and is defined as critical anarchism43. The 
notion of critical philosophical anarchism described in this way is, nonetheless, 
insufficiently defined and general enough to refer to almost any kind of anarchism. 
This is the main reason why it is considered impractical and yields to more concise 
competitive classifications.
There is one more aspect of Wolff’s concepts worth considering. It triggered 
subsequent classifications around his ideas and inspired various types of approach-
es to philosophical anarchism. One of these classifications was created by A. J. 
41 J. Horton, Political…, p. 129.
42 C. Gans, Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience, Cambridge 1992, p. 2.
43 Ibidem.
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Simmons, an American philosopher, who looked at philosophical anarchism from 
a different point of view, initiating a priori and a posteriori approaches. It is worth 
mentioning that the classification suggested by Simmons is suitable not only for 
philosophical anarchism but also for some other anarchistic theories in general.
The a priori approach to philosophical anarchism is based on the idea that 
the existence of a state or a state authority considered to be morally legitimate is 
impossible. A typical example of this approach would be Wolff’s concept. How-
ever, as Rex Martin points out, Wolff contradicts himself by assuming that one 
type of legitimate state may actually occur – the one based on the idea that indirect 
democracy exists and that it is possible to achieve unanimity under this system44.
The thesis that it is impossible for a legitimate state to occur is explained 
by the existence of certain essential features characteristic of state and statehood 
in its functioning based on hierarchical structure and having a clearly obligatory 
character. These features, as well as the remarks on the insoluble conflict between 
autonomy and authority, are the major arguments to support the assumption that it 
is impossible for a legitimate state to occur45. We may even conclude that a phrase 
containing the term legitimate state would be a sort of oxymoron.
Nevertheless, taking into account the critical remarks mentioned earlier on 
Wolff’s main assumptions on which he based his theory, we have to agree both with 
Simmons, who negates the a priori approach by considering it seriously defec-
tive46, and with Reiman, who claims that the occurrence of obligation to obey a law 
is not logically impossible and does not impair the individual responsibility of man 
to determine what to do in particular circumstances. To cut things short, author-
ity and autonomy are not logically contradictory; thus, it is not possible to deduct 
a priori anarchism from individual moral autonomy47.
If the above conclusions are taken into account, Wolff’s concept does not 
look nearly as destructive for legitimate authority (directly) and for the idea of 
political obligation (indirectly) as may initially seem to be the case. Therefore, we 
cannot agree that the argumentation he used supports anarchistic approaches in 
a convincing and positive way. To sum up, the fact that he based his overall argu-
mentation on the idea of authority and autonomy being contradictory turned out to 
be the weakest – although intended as the strongest – point in his thesis.
44 R. Martin, Wolff’s Defense of Philosophical Anarchism, “The Philosophical Quarterly” 1974, Vol. 24, 
No. 95, p. 141.
45 A. J. Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy…, p. 105.
46 Idem, The Anarchist Position: A Reply to Klosko and Senor, “Philosophy and Public Affairs” 1987, 
Vol. 16, No. 3, p. 269.
47 J. H. Reiman, Anarchism and Nominalism: Wolff’s Latest Obituary for Political Philosophy, “Ethics” 
1978, Vol. 89, No. 1, p. 8; see also: J. H. Reiman, In Defense of Political Philosophy. A Reply to R. P. Wolff’s “In 
Defense of Anarchism”, New York 1972, p. 10–12.
